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Immigration laws and regulations are implemented by United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel in ac-
cordance with Service promulgated "Operations Instructions."
These instructions can be more crucial to the determination of an
alien's rights than the terms of the statute itself. Mr. Wildes finds
that the courts are slowly beginning to recognize that many such
instructions have a substantial impact on aliens' rights and may
sometimes convey very tangible substantive benefits. The author
contends that the courts should more consistently treat these in-
structions as rules to be promulgated, implemented, and gener-
ally applied in a consistent and fair manner.
Perhaps one of the thorniest issues in administrative law today
is the proper evaluation of written or verbal expressions of an ad-
ministrative agency with regard to past, present, and future con-
duct. What effect is to be given these expressions? To what
extent are they binding upon the agency? When are they prece-
dential in nature? When should they be considered rules? While
the litany continues, ultimate resolution of the issue continues to
escape us.
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In the area of immigration and nationality law, this issue has
been raised from time to time, particularly with reference to the
internal directives and instructions of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) as compiled within the Operations In-
structions.1 The Immigration and Naturalization Service has
steadfastly maintained that these Operations Instructions are
merely intra-agency guidelines which create no substantive
rights, have no precedential value, and are not binding. Some Op-
erations Instructions have been so construed by the courts.2
However, that has not always been the case.3
It is the purpose of this article to analyze some recent court de-
cisions with regard to the legal effect of various Operations In-
structions, particularly those relating to the Nonpriority
(Deferred Action) Program of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, a creation of the Operations Instructions, 4 and to suggest
what may be the import of these decisions with respect to the Op-
erations Instructions in general.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NoNnnIO-R INSTRUCTION
The Nonpriority (Deferred Action) Program
The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration Service was in
existence for many years to defer action in deportation cases in
situations in which, because of humanitarian reasons, expulsion
of aliens would not be appropriate. A case may be recommended
for nonpriority treatment by the District Director at any stage of a
deportation proceeding. The Operations Instructions list the cri-
teria used in determining whether a recommendation for deferred
action or nonpriority treatment is appropriate: 1) advanced or
tender age, 2) long residence in the United States, 3) physical or
mental condition requiring care or treatment in the United States,
4) family situation that would be affected by expulsion, and 5) re-
cent conduct.5 A review and analysis of the cases in which non-
1. IMMGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS, AND INTERPRETATIONS (1952,
as revised 1979) [hereinafter cited as OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS].
2. E.g., Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D.N.J. 1975).
3. E.g., Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 984-85 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
4. OPERATIONS INSTRUCTONs, supra note 1, § 103.1(a) (1) (i), at 371.
5. The criteria cited are included in Operations Instruction 103.1(a) (1) (ii):
When determining whether a case should be recommended for deferred
action category, consideration should include but not be limited to the fol-
lowing- (1) advanced or tender age; (2) number of years presence in the
United States; (3) physical or mental condition requiring care or treat-
ment in the United States; (4) family situation in the United States-effect
of expulsion; (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or affiliations-
recent conduct. If the district director's recommendation is approved by
the regional commissioner the alien shall be notified that no action will be
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priority classification had been recommended in accordance with
the Operations Instructions indicated that nonpriority classifica-
tion was almost exclusively recommended in order to avoid an
unwarranted hardship upon the subject alien or members of his
family.6
Prior to 1975 the recommendation of the District Director on
Form G-312, submitted to the Regional Commissioner, was for-
warded to the Commissioner's office in Washington, D.C., for re-
view. This procedure was modified in 1975, eliminating the
referral to the Commissioner's office.
The Nonpriority (Deferred Action) Program Goes Public
The existence of the Nonpriority Program was not widely
known prior to 1975. The INS considered it an internal adminis-
trative device; the relevant Operations Instruction was published
in the notorious "blue pages" of the officer's manual, which were
not available to the public. Details of this program became avail-
able as a result of a Freedom of Information suit filed on behalf of
the former Beatle, John Lennon.7 As a result of that lawsuit,
upon the urging of the United States Attorney who recognized
that the program was already in the public domain, the Immigra-
tion Service issued its revised Operations Instruction in the part
of its manual made available to the public on April 30, 1975.
The INS steadfastly maintained that nonpriority status was
merely an intra-agency guideline, which conferred no substantive
right but which recognized that the District Director needed an
administrative convenience in order to exercise what the Service
referred to as "prosecutorial discretion." The Immigration Serv-
ice has steadfastly maintained this position.8
taken by the Service to disturb his immigration status, or that his depar-
ture from the United States has been deferred indefinitely, whichever is
appropriate.
Id.
6. See Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 53 n.6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wildes, The Nonpriority
Program Goes Public]. See also Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (pts. 1 & 2), 53 INERPRETER RELEASES 25, 33
(1976).
7. Lermon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (SD.N.Y. 1974).
8. See Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Goes Public, supra note 6; at 72.
THE NoNpBiorry OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION IN THE COURTS
The Circuits in Conflict
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lennon v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service9 was the first circuit court to
focus on the nature of this particular Operations Instruction. The
court had no need to go into a detailed analysis of this provision
because its decision in Lennon v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service paved the way for granting permanent residence to Len-
non and made the Nonpriority Program unnecessary and irrele-
vant to Lennon. Nevertheless, the footnote reference by the
Second Circuit describes the Nonpriority Program as an "infor-
mal administrative stay of deportation."'O
The Fifth Circuit in Soon Bok Yoon v. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service," in reviewing the deportation proceedings ini-
tiated against Soon Bok Yoon, held that there was no
requirement that an alien respondent be informed during the
course of deportation proceedings of the possible applicability of
nonpriority status. The court further held that the decision to
grant or withhold nonpriority status was within the "particular
discretion of the INS"12 and that an agency such as the INS had
the power "to create and employ such a category for its own ad-
ministrative convenience without standardizing the category and
allowing applications for inclusion in it."'3 Differentiating the re-
lief provided in Operations Instruction 103.1(a) (1) (ii) by charac-
terizing nonpriority status as a "voluntary stay of the agency's
mandate pendente lite, issued in large part for the convenience of
the INS,"14 the Fifth Circuit concluded that such relief was partic-
ularly appropriate in cases such as Lennon in which "permanent
status rights turn on collateral legal issues of great subtlety"15 but
was "inappropriate where, as here, deportability is conceded and
only delay is desired."16
9. 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 191 n.7. It is interesting to note, however, that subsequent to the ini-
tiation of the Freedom of Information Act suit on behalf of John Lennon, the Dis-
trict Director of the New York office of the INS recommended John Lennon for
nonpriority treatment on September 16, 1975, which request was approved by the
Regional Commissioner on September 23, 1975. The issue became moot about a
week later when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals, which had found Lennon excludable from
the United States. Id. at 187.
11. 538 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1976).
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This analysis is most puzzling because in Lennon, as in any
other deportation case on appeal from the Board of Immigration
Appeals to a Circuit Court, a grant of nonpriority would not be
necessary to determine collateral issues because all action on the
deportation order is automatically stayed by statute.17 Further-
more, in Lennon, the request for nonpriority treatment was initi-
ated by counsel based upon humanitarian considerations in the
alien's situation, pursuant to the Operations Instruction, and was
in fact granted upon the basis of the humanitarian considerations
alleged by counsel.'8 However faulty the analysis, the Fifth Cir-
cuit was simply not willing to concede that the Immigration Serv-
ice, through its Operations Instruction, might very well have
promulgated a legislative rule, which created a substantive right
for the benefit of aliens.
The Eighth Circuit did not accept the Fifth Circuit approach
that nonpriority status existed merely for the administrative con-
venience of the Immigration Service. The court, in Vergel v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service,19 while upholding a
deportation order, stayed its mandate for ninety days to afford the
alien an opportunity to petition the District Director for a discre-
tionary stay of deportation on humanitarian grounds pursuant to
the Operations Instruction. The court found that "deportation
[would] cause severe hardship not only to Ms. Vergel but also to
the invalid child involved. Thus, there is a substantial basis upon
which the District Director could place petitioner in a 'deferred
action category' allowing her to remain in this country on humani-
tarian grounds."
20
Although the Eighth Circuit neither expands its analysis of the
Operations Instruction nor reaches any general conclusions with
respect to the nature of the program, it is at odds with the inter-
pretation of the Fifth Circuit in that it recognizes that a humanita-
rian remedy is available to the alien through the District Director.
Moreover, the court impliedly concludes that this relief is in some
17. 8 U.S.C. § l105a(a) (3) (1976).
18. Form G-312, which was prepared by the District Director and which recom-
mended nonpriority consideration, indicated that the Director based his recom-
mendation on the attached formal presentation made by counsel for Mr. Lennon.
19. 536 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1976).
20. Id. at 757-58. See also David v. INS, 548 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1977) (Eighth Cir-
cuit again upheld a deportation order denying the petitioner relief but stayed the
mandate for 90 days to allow the alien to apply to the District Director for a "de-
ferred action category" (nonpriority status)).
manner a "right" which can be requested of the District Director
by an alien.
Nicholas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service-The Ninth
Circuit Squarely Faces the Issue
The court in Nicholas v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice21 squarely faced the District Director's action with reference
to a nonpriority claim. Petitioner had asked the court of appeals
to overrule the District Director's decision denying nonpriority
status to Nicholas. The court of appeals, in reaching its decision,
found it necessary to focus upon the appropriate standard of re-
view. As it had in Lennon, the INS maintained that nonpriority
status should be viewed as comparable to prosecutorial discretion
and that accordingly, in order for a reversal to be justified, a
showing had to be made that an established pattern of treatment
of others similarly situated was departed from without reason
and that the decision was based upon impermissible considera-
tions such as race or religion.
Petitioner advocated a strict standard,22 which is the test uti-
lized to review discretionary suspension of deportation under sec-
tion 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.23 This
21. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
22. Id. at 805-06. The INS argued for a standard allowing greater agency dis-
cretion, citing United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Ortega Alvarez, 506 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975); United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Berrios,
501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974). Id. at 805.
23. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976)
provides:
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in
his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien
who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provi-
sions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceeding the date of such application, and proves
that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral charac-
ter; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attor-
ney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence; or
(2) is deportable under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14),
(15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 1251(a) of this title; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
years immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption
of a status, constituting a ground for deportation, and proves that during
all of such period he has been and is a person of good moral character;
and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
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standard, cited in Rassano v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,24 requires only that the court find the decision "arbitrary
or capricious or an abuse of discretion."2
The Ninth Circuit, in a carefully reasoned opinion, concluded
that this instruction confers a "substantive benefit upon the alien,
rather than setting up an administrative convenience." 26 The
court distinguished this case from Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi27 in
finding that the instruction clearly and directly affects substantive
rights and, in fact, very closely parallels the suspension of depor-
tation statute in that "its effect can be final and permanent, with
the same force as that of a Congressional statute."
28
After considering the approaches of the other circuits, the Ninth
Circuit clearly held that through the issuance of this Operations
Instruction, the INS had created a legislative rule which parallels
in effect a Congressional statute and that the agency should be
held to the same standard of review.29 The court found (a) that
the sole basis for granting relief under this Operations Instruction
is the presence of humanitarian factors; (b) that the Instruction is
directive in nature--'he District Director shall recommend"; and
(c) that the effect of such relief upon a deportation order is to de-
fer it indefinitely.3 0 Indeed, a substantive right had been created
within the discretion of the District Director pursuant to this Op-
erations Instruction paralleling that established by statute in sec-
tion 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Unfortunately, the Nicholas case was one of those instances in
which the operation was a success but the patient died. The
court, in holding for the petitioner, said that if a showing could be
made that the District Director's decision to deviate from the
norm was arbitrary or capricious it must be reversed. However,
the court found Nicholas unable to demonstrate the norm with re-
gard to nonpriority decisions and thus unable to prove deviation
24. "492 F.2d 220, 227 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 1113 (1975). See also
Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Goes Public, supra note 6, at 64 n.56.
25. Id. at 227.
26. Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975).
28. Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979).
29. Id. at 808. "It would be curious, to say the least, if, of two procedures with
potentially identical impact upon the alien, there was qualitatively more discretion
for the one without direct Congressional approval than for the Congressionally ap-
proved procedure." Id. at 807.
30. Id. at 806.
from the norm.31 Nicholas had submitted only the findings of the
study by Wildes32 based on the data obtained in the Lennon dis-
trict court proceedings. 33 The court rejected the study as an inad-
equate basis, pointing out that the article digested only the cases
in which nonpriority status was approved.34
By all standards, the implications of the Nicholas decision are
far-reaching. The INS has evolved a program conferring a sub-
stantial benefit upon aliens, which apparently, at least in the view
of two distinguished circuit courts, has the force and impact of a
rule and perhaps even that of a statute. All this notwithstanding,
the Immigration Service has attempted to play down the impact
of this program.
In accordance with a well-established principle of administra-
tive law, a written expression of "policy" may be a rule and have
the impact of a rule, regardless of how the agency attempts to
designate or describe it.35 The Operations Instruction thus ap-
pears to be a firm rule. As such, it should probably be subject to
the notice and publication requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.36 This author would suggest that this conclusion
is in accordance with present-day administrative law and that the
same principle is probably equally applicable to a number of
other Operations Instructions.
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS AS ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
The Administrative Law Background
The question of when the pronouncements of an administrative
31. Id. at 808.
32. Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Goes Public, supra note 6.
33. Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1979).
34. Id. Ironically, sometime subsequent to the decision in Nicholas v. INS,
pursuant to an agreement reached between counsel for John Lennon and the Gov-
ernment regarding the ongoing matter of Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), counsel received the record copies of all G-312s for a six-month
period from May, 1976, to November, 1976, in which nonpriority recommendations
by the District Director in the Northeastern Region had been rejected. Not a sin-
gle case had been rejected on its merits. In each case, the Regional Commissioner
referred the record back to the District Director, pointing out that nonpriority was
not needed, either because deportation had already been stayed or because alter-
native relief was available. Letter from Thomas H. Belote, Assistant U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York (May 1, 1979). It appears that there is abso-
lutely no data available from which one could infer the norm or standard for
reaching a nonpriority decision other than the data analyzed and published in the
San Diego Law Review, Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Goes Public, supra note
6, which was presented to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Nonpriority
records of denied cases are presumably retained by the Regional Commissioner
for only six months.
35. See text accompanying notes 35-43 infra.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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agency take on the effect and impact of rules has defied resolution
for decades. Numerous authorities have attempted to craft a
workable definition.37 The Administrative Procedure Act defines
a rule as
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular appli-
cability and future effect, designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice re-
quirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures, or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services, or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the fore-
going.
38
This definition, which focuses on the nature of a rule as being of
general or particular applicability, is effectively directed to the
"future effect" of the rule. Although the definition is useful in de-
termining the nature of a rule, we must look to past case law to
determine what effect will be given to an agency's statement.
It is clear from administrative law history that the format of a
statement is not determinative of whether it is in fact a rule. In
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,39 the
Supreme Court held that regulations promulgated by the Federal
Communications Commission were a reviewable "order," even
though they purported to merely announce a policy describing
the circumstances in which the Commission would deny licenses.
The court stated that "[t]he particular label placed upon it by the
Commission is not necessarily conclusive, for it is the substance
of what the Commission has purported to do and has done which
is decisive."40 Similarly, in cases in which the Immigration Serv-
ice might claim that a particular Operations Instruction is merely
an intra-agency directive, its conclusion may not necessarily be
confirmed in court. We must look to other factors to determine
whether it is a rule with legislative effect.
41
37. See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HAnv. I. REV. 259,
260-65 (1938). See also J. DIcKENsoN, ADMIIsTRATrvE JusTIcE AND THE SUPREMACY
OF LAW 19-21 (1927).
38. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
39. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
40. Id. at 416. The historical underpinnings of this principle go as far back as
an 1833 decision of the Supreme Court which indicated that "usages have been es-
tablished in every department of the government, which have become a kind of
common law, and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within their re-
spective limits." United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833).
41. See the criteria outlined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (b), (d), 552(a) (1) (1976), which
distinguish among legislative rules, interpretive rules, general statements of pol-
icy, and rules of agency organization. See also K. DAvis, ADMnISTRATIVE LAW OF
There appear to be two dominant considerations involved. His-
torically, the prevailing law has been that a statement is con-
strued as a legislative rule when the agency has exercised a
delegated power to regulate. If the promulgated rule is not within
the context of the exercise of the delegated power, it is not a leg-
islative rule.42 However, a series of cases has developed a differ-
ent theory which relates to the effect of the agency's
pronouncement rather than to the jurisdictional area of the
agency's activity.43 These cases postulate that the critical issue is
the so-called "substantial impact" or lack of substantial impact of
the rule promulgated. This latter theory, developed through case
law in the 1970s, has figured critically in construing Operations In-
structions of the Immigration Service.
The determination by a court as to which test to apply to an Op-
erations Instruction can be critical. Once an Operations Instruc-
tion is construed to be a legislative rule, and perhaps even an
interpretive rule,4 4 it will be subject to the advance notice and
publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act45
and will be binding upon the agency.46
The Lewis-Mota Decision
Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor47 has had considerable influ-
ence on this issue, which relates to the application of section
212(a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,48 as applied by
the Department of Labor through its regulations. Lewis-Mota
serves as a precedent in construing Operations Instructions of the
Immigration Service itself. Under section 212 (a) (14) of the Act,
aliens seeking to enter the United States to perform skilled or un-
skilled labor are excludable from the United States unless the
Secretary of Labor has certified that there is an insufficient
number of workers in the United States who are able, willing, and
qualified to perform the job and that the employment of such
THE SEVENTIES, § 5.03 (1976). Although the distinctions are obscure and difficult
to evaluate, it is apparent that when an agency statement is determined to be an
administratively created "legislative" rule, it has the effect of and most closely re-
sembles actual legislation in all of its practical effects.
42. See K. DAvIs, ADMImsTRATIvE LAw OF THE SEVENTIES, § 5.03 (1976). See
also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
43. See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See also K. DAVIS, AD mINSTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 5.03-1 (1976).
44. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 5.03.4. See also Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
45. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-553 (1976).
46. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1974). See also Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
47. 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1976).
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aliens will not adversely affect the wages or working conditions of
American workers.49 The Secretary of the Department of Labor
has issued schedules, among which is Schedule C, which sets
forth a "Precertification List" designating occupations in which
there is a shortage of labor in a specified geographic area. The
schedule was issued after advance public notice in the Federal
Register, thus permitting public comment. It was occasionally
amended thereafter without following this procedure and was
finally rescinded in its entirety pursuant to a directive of the Sec-
retary of Labor and without advance public notice. 0
The issue before the court in Lewis-Mota was whether this sus-
pension of Schedule C was valid, considering the notice and pub-
lication requirements of section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.51 The district court held that rulemaking was not
an issue because the Secretary's statutory power was limited to
making a factual determination as to availability of American
workers. The Second Circuit disagreed, referring to the rescission
"as an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement... law or policy."52 In re-
versing the district court, the Second Circuit held that since the
directives suspending Schedule C "changed existing rights and
obligations" and thus had "substantial impact upon both aliens
and employers," notice of opportunity for comment should have
been provided through publication.53 In essence, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that given the substantial impact of
this directive, it was a rule subject to the advance notice require-
ments of section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Al-
though the court's decision was widely accepted, at least one au-
49. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1976),
excludes from the United States:
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing
skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined
and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A)
there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing,
qualified ... and available at the time of application for a visa and admis-
sion to the United States and at the place where the alien is destined to
perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such
aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the
workers in the United States similarly employed....
50. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 480 (2d Cir. 1972).
51. Id. at 481.
52. Id. at 480 (quoting language in 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976)).
53. Id. at 482.
thority has questioned its rationale.5 4
The Voluntary Departure Cases
Operations Instruction 103.1 was only one of several Instruc-
tions, outlining policies or programs of the INS, about which the
courts were forced to decide if the Operations Instruction was in
fact a rule. Pursuant to Operations Instruction 242.10, provision
was made for the District Director to grant extended or indefinite
periods of voluntary departure under prescribed circumstances.
Historically, this benefit was described only in the Operations In-
structions and became the subject of litigation concerning its sta-
tus as an administrative rule.
In Buckley v. Gibney,55 the petitioner was the beneficiary of an
approved sixth preference petition.56 He maintained that he was
entitled to a stay of deportation and a grant of indefinite "volun-
tary departure" based upon Operations Instructions 242.10(b) and
242.10 (a) (6).57 The court noted that this latter Operations Instruc-
tion provided that the beneficiary of an approved sixth preference
who also qualified for third preference and who could not obtain a
visa solely because a visa number was unavailable could be
granted voluntary departure, allowing him to remain in the
United States until a visa did become available.5 8
54. Professor Davis criticized the reasoning of the court, contending that it
was not necessary to use the substantial impact test. The analysis, according to
Davis, should have been as to whether rulemaking power had been delegated to
the Department of Labor and whether the Department, promulgating this direc-
tive, had intended to exercise that power. See K. DAVIs, ADMiNmSTRATivE LAw oF
THE SEvENTImS § 5.03-2 (1976).
55. 332 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
56. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976), immigrant visas are allocated according
to a preference system which lists seven preference categories and one nonprefer-
ence category. Sixth preference visa numbers are made available to beneficiaries
of an approved petition filed on their behalf if they qualify under § 1153(a)(6)
which reads:
Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151 (a) (1) or (2) of this title, to
qualified immigrants who are capable of performing specified skilled or
unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which a
shortage of employable and willing persons exists in the United States.
57. Buckley v. Gibney, 332 F. Supp. 790, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
58. Id. Special consideration was given to alien professionals and persons
who had exceptional ability in the arts or sciences, encompassed within the third
preference classification. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (3) (1976):
Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151 (a) (ii) of this title, to quali-
fied immigrants who are members of the professions, or who because of
their exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially bene-
fit prospectively the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the
United States, and whose services in the professions, sciences or arts are
sought by an employer in the United States.
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The court, however, found that the petitioner did not qualify for
the third preference.5 9 Moreover, the court found that even if the
petitioner did so qualify, it would not have been an abuse of dis-
cretion to deny him the privilege of extended voluntary depar-
ture, given petitioner's violation of the immigration laws.60 The
Buckley court seems to imply that to some extent the Operations
Instruction did establish fixed criteria, and perhaps a rule, with
which a District Director was bound to comply. However, in the
very same decision, in the course of refuting petitioner's argu-
ment that the holders of sixth preference approvals were being
discriminated against in violation of the due process clause, the
court stated:
Buckley is not being deported, however, under any Operation Instruc-
tions; he is being deported under the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2), be-
cause he is illegally in the country. These Operation Instructions affect
Buckley only insofar as they serve as a guide in considering his request
for voluntary departure; their only effect is that they fail to recommend
the extension of the privilege of voluntary departure to beneficiaries of ap-
proved sixth preference petitions.\ The Operation Instructions do not re-
quire that requests by such beneficiaries be denied; they simply
encourage the granting of requests by beneficiaries of greater prefer-
ences.
6 1
The Bucldey court held that if the Immigration Service has
"carved out" a policy of extended voluntary departure through its
Operations Instructions for third preference petition holders, the
failure to do so for sixth preference petition holders cannot be
challenged. Admittedly, the court went further, implying that the
Operations Instruction in this instance was only "a guide" in con-
sidering a request for voluntary departure. That implication was
clearly not the focus of this decision, however; it was dictum un-
supported by any careful analysis of the applicability of law re-
garding the effect of administrative rules.
Not so, however, in Noel v. Chapman.6 2 At issue in Noel was a
directive issued under the identical Operations Instruction, advis-
ing District Directors to deny extended departure time to West-
ern Hemisphere aliens who have the requisite family status
qualifying them for visas unless compelling circumstances war-
ranted this relief.
63
59. Buckley v. Gibney, 332 F. Supp. 790, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
60. Id. at 795. Buckley had intered the country as a visitor. He thereafter vio-
lated a condition of his visa by accepting employment. Id.
61. Id. at 796.
62. 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
63. Id. at 1025. This directive was issued as a result of advice given on June 27,
Again, as in Buckley, petitioner's construction of the Operations
Instruction was rejected. The Second Circuit held that the re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act mandating publi-
cation and notice were not applicable because the Act exempts
from its publication requirements "general statements of pol-
icy."64 Admitting that there is much confusion about what is
meant by a "statement of policy," the court nevertheless found
that this exception was applicable here.65 The Second Circuit
went on to state that because 8 C.F.R. § 244.2-a regulation pro-
mulgated in accordance with the publication procedures-indi-
cated that it was within the sole jurisdiction of the District Direc-
tor to grant voluntary departure, these Operations Instructions
could be viewed merely as intra-agency guidelines.66 The court
also purported to distinguish Lewis-Mota, stating that application
of the "substantial impact" test would also result in the rejection
of this Operations Instruction as a rule. The court reasoned that
because this particular Operations Instruction did not change the
fact that authority to extend voluntary departure was delegated to
the District Director's sole discretion, no existing rights had been
changed.67
This reasoning appears somewhat ingenious as the Second Cir-
cuit admits that it was the established policy of the District Direc-
tor of New York to 'routinely" grant extensions of stay in cases of
aliens married to lawful resident aliens, such as petitioner in this
case. The court appears to ignore the obvious fact that Noel's
rights had been most significantly affected as a result of this di-
rective.68
1972, by Congressman Peter Rodino, then chairman of the Subcommittee on Immi-
gration of the House Committee on the Judiciary, to the Commissioner of the INS.
Rodino reported that hearings of his subcommittee had indicated that the employ-
ment of illegal aliens in this country was unfavorably influencing the domestic job
market and that it would therefore not be appropriate to routinely permit this
class of aliens to remain in the United States to await issuance of their visas. The
directive in its final form, issued on April 10th, 1973, established April 10th as a
cutoff date. Extensions of voluntary departure would still be permitted for aliens
who were present in the United States and who had the requisite family ties prior
to April 10th, 1973. Id.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (1976). But see id. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1976).
65. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. It is suggested that the court's reasoning was erroneous, even if one were
not to apply the "substantial impact" test and determine the status of the Opera-
tions Instruction as a rule, based upon whether the agency was delegated author-
ity to make rules in this area and whether the agency, by issuing this directive,
intended to exercise its delegated authority. The INS was clearly delegated the
authority to administer the departure of aliens from the United States. It is also
quite clear from the circumstances of this case that the Service intended to formu-
late a rule with respect to the issuance of extended voluntary departure, as the
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The issue was not resolved with the Second Circuit Court's de-
cision in Noel v. Chapman. In Parco v. Morris,69 provisions under
this Operations Instruction were recognized for their effect as ad-
ministrative rules. At issue was the same directive considered in
Noel v. Chapman; this directive also terminated portions of Oper-
ations Instruction 242.10(a) (6), which provided for the routine
granting of extended voluntary departure for beneficiaries of ap-
proved third preference petitions.
The Pennsylvania District Court declined to follow Noel and
distinguished the Noel decision. In Parco the Government stipu-
lated on behalf of the Philadelphia INS Director that the precipi-
tous rescission of the Operations Instruction was the sole reason
for the denial of Parco's request for an extension of voluntary de-
parture. Therefore, the court held, the District Director was no
longer exercising discretion, but was in fact abiding by an inflexi-
ble rule issued by the Immigration Service.7
0
Clearly, the distinction is purely formal. Although in Noel v.
Chapman no stipulation was made on behalf of the government,
it appears obvious that the New York District Director's decision
to deny Noel's request for an extension of voluntary departure
was also based solely upon the directive. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeal admitted that requests for voluntary departure
were routinely granted prior to the directive mandating the
change in policy.71 Furthermore, the Parco court applied the
"substantial impact" test and concluded, contra to Noel, that this
directive does in fact have a substantial impact, is not merely a
guide to the exercise of discretion, and is therefore subject to the
notice and publication requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act72
It is quite clear that the decisions concerning the "extended vol-
untary departure" provisions of the Operations Instructions have
come full circle. Although the courts in earlier decisions were re-
luctant to apply the administrative law principle of the "substan-
specific purpose of its directive was to cancel a previous policy prevalent in the
New York District Office of the INS, and it was adopted as a direct result of criti-
cism by Congressman Rodino.
69. 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
70. Id. at 984.
71. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1975).
72. Parco v. Morris, 462 F. Supp. 976, 984-85 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The court specifi-
cally found that it was bound by Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969),
which applied the "substantial impact" test. Id. at 985.
tial impact" test, they did so in later cases. Eventually a federal
court was willing to recognize that this Operations Instruction
was in fact an administrative rule.73 This evolution strikingly par-
allels the series of cases analyzing the nonpriority program of the
INS under Operations Instruction 103, concluding with the Ninth
Circuit decision in Nicholas v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service.74
The Asylum Cases
The attempts of the Immigration Service to formulate proce-
dures for the assessment of claims for political asylum have fol-
lowed a similar course in the courts. Here too, the initial court
opinions considered the directives of the Service as guides. This
position was modified by subsequent decisions which held that
the directives were binding as rules upon the Service.
In Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi75 and Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi,76
petitioners' claims to asylum, pursuant to an Operations Instruc-
tion promulgated by the INS, were rejected. Plaintiffs, natives of
the People's Republic of China, allegedly fled from that country
because of Communist persecution, going first to Hong Kong and
thereafter to the United States. The Lin plaintiffs maintained
that they were entitled to political asylum pursuant to the terms
of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. 77 The court rejected the claim, reasoning that the Protoco1
78
applied only to aliens lawfully in the country.7 9 The Lin plaintiffs
were unlawfully in the United States.
8 0
The Cheng plaintiffs claimed that a right to full consideration of
their request for political asylum should be recognized pursuant
to Operations Instruction 108.1(f).81 Operations Instruction 108.1
provided for the granting of political asylum if the possibility of
persecution was established and, in the alternative, for an in-
depth interview by the District Director in order to make a proper
assessment of the facts to be forwarded to the State Department's
73. In conformity with the Parco decision, § 242.5(a) (2) (D) was published in
title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations after it met the appropriate publication
and notice requirements. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a) (2) (vi) (D) (1979).
74. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979). For an analysis of the Nicholas case, see text
accompanying notes 21-36 supra.
75. 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973).
76. 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975).
77. Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D.N.J. 1973).
78. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for accession Jan. 31,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, TJ.A.S. No. 6577.
79. Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177, 183-84 (D.N.J. 1973).
80. Id.
81. Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D.N.J. 1975).
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Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs.82 Petitioners claimed
that a subsequent directive, dated February 14, 1973, which ad-
vised District Directors that the State Department would no
longer entertain asylum requests from aliens who had left Com-
munist China and had thereafter resided in Hong Kong for a sub-
stantial period of time before arriving in the United States, could
not, as the directive indicated, render the Operations Instruction
inoperative. Petitioners claimed that a right had been created
which could not be abrogated without compliance with proper
rulemaking procedures.83
The Cheng court found that this Operations Instruction merely
implemented the right of asylum granted by section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.84 It also found that the subse-
quent directive merely implemented the State Department's ad-
vice, confirming that the Department was making a negative
recommendation in any case in which petitioners had remained
for a substantial period of time in Hong Kong, regardless of the
facts elicited in any in-depth interview conducted by the Immigra-
tion Service.85 Accordingly, neither had a right been created, nor
any right subsequently abrogated.
There is no evidence of any attempt by the court in these cases
to analyze in terms of administrative law principles the construc-
tion placed on the Operations Instruction involved. Moreover,
there is an interesting "epilogue" in the Yan Wo Cheng deci-
sion,86 in which Judge Lacey castigates the so-called "program of
delay"87 which he believed the petitioners and their representa-
tives had entered into in the course of the proceedings. Although
he declares that his decision was based solely upon the facts and
the law relative to the case, the implication is clear that he was
less than sympathetic to petitioner's claim of right by virtue of
the Operations Instruction.
The issue was again rai~ed in several court actions filed on be-
half of Haitians seeking refuge in the United States.88 It was
claimed that, in accordance with the Protocol Relating to the Sta-
82. OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 1, § 108.1.
83. Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583, 588 (D.N.J. 1975).
84. Id. at 589. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1976).
85. Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D.N.J. 1975).
86. Id. at 590.
87. Id. at 591.
88. Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated and re-
tus of Refugees, 89 petitioners were entitled to a full formal eviden-
tiary hearing with respect to their claims for political asylum and,
accordingly, that the pro-forma interviews conducted by the Dis-
trict Director's representatives pursuant to the Operations In-
struction described above were inadequate. The District Court
for the Southern District of Florida accepted the claim and found
for the petitioners in Sannon v. United States.90 Three weeks af-
ter this decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Pierre v. United States,91 found for the Immigration Service and
against petitioners on identical claims and facts. A Notice of Ap-
peal was filed by the Immigration Service in Sannon, and a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed by the petitioners in Pierre.
Subsequently, the Government indicated that it was preparing
revised regulations, with respect to the asylum procedure, which
would make the contentions of petitioners in Sannon and Pierre
moot. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certio-
rari on November 28, 1977, and the judgement of the Fifth Circuit
in Pierre was vacated and remanded to the Fifth Circuit to con-
sider the mootness question.92
On September 13, 1978, the new INS regulations concerning ap-
plications for parole in connection with exclusion hearings were
published in the Federal Register.93 On remand, the Sannon
court ruled that these regulations were invalid because they were
not published in accordance with the notice and publication re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.94
Once the web of litigation is untangled, it becomes clear that
the Immigration Service has been constrained, with reference to
its procedure in political asylum applications, to give due defer-
ence to an alien's claim of right. Significantly, and unlike the vol-
untary departure policy or the Nonpriority Program, the rights
manded, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
89. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for accession Jan. 31,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. Article 33 of the Protocol reads in part: "No
Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner what-
soever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion."
90. 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated and remanded, 566 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir. 1978).
91. 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
92. Pierre v. United States, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
93. See 43 Fed. Reg. 40,802 (1978).
94. Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla. 1978). Subsequently
the Immigration Service, in compliance with the principles set forth in this court
decision, followed the appropriate procedures for notice of publication. Final regu-
lations with respect to asylum applications were eventually published and made
effective as of May 10, 1979. See 43 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (1978).
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developed and expanded were not the creation of the internal pol-
icy of the Immigration Service itself, but of another authority.
Nevertheless, a situation evolved in which a policy or program of
the Immigration Service, deemphasized by the Service itself and
described in its Operations Instructions as merely an internal
guide, was in fact held to be a rule, binding upon the Service in its
treatment of asylum claims.
SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM PARCO, SANNON, AND NICHOLAS
FOR THE FUTURE
Perhaps it is presumptuous to infer any pattern from the lines
of cases described above. The federal courts are beginning to rec-
ognize, with respect to the policies of the INS, that given the im-
mense enforcement and regulatory power of the Immigration
Service over the lives of aliens, the programs and policies that the
Service promulgates must be carefully scrutinized in view of their
"substantial impact" on the alien community. This is especially
true if the exercise of discretion by officials of the INS can have a
direct effect upon a person's ability to remain within the borders
of the United States as a free person.
The Immigration Service is not insensitive to this issue. In fact,
a group of officers was convened under the chairmanship of the
Associate Commissioner, Examinations, to study various areas of
Service operation in which discretion is exercised under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. The comnittee identified several
areas in which it believed criteria for the exercise of discretion
should be spelled out more explicitly. It published a series of pro-
posed rules in the Federal Register.95 The proposals are wide-
ranging, covering such areas as the criteria for making available
evidence used in the adjudication of a petition,9 6 the determina-
tion of bonds, 97 the revocation of approved petitions,9 8 documen-
95. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,187 (1979). The proposal noted: '"The service believes that
it is necessary that criteria for the exercise of discretion be developed and pub-
lished in its regulations to assure that all applicants and petitioners receive fair
and equal treatment before the Service." The "summary" paragraph of the pro-
posed rules stated: '"These amendments are necessary in order to place in our
regulations the discretionary criteria we use in making administrative decisions.
We desire these criteria to be available to all Service personnel and to all mem-
bers of the public, attorneys and representatives, applicants and petitioners who
come before the Service." Id.
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,187 (1979).
97. See id. at 36,188.
98. Id.
tary requirements for admission,99 discretionary criteria for
adjustments of status to that of a person admitted for permanent
residence,100 stays of deportation,' 0 ' and others. 0 2 Submitted
separately on the same date was a proposal setting forth the crite-
ria to be used by District Directors in awarding grants of volun-
tary departure prior to the commencement of a hearing.103 Some
of these criteria are newly developed or expanded; others are, at
least in part, already included in the Operations Instructions.1
04
What is significant about the Committee's commendable work
is its recognition of the fact that discretion must be exercised in a
consistent and uniform manner and, perhaps most important of
all, in a predictable manner. Implicit in this Service de facto rec-
ognition that the proper exercise of discretion must be consistent
and predictable is an acceptance of the fact that a right has been
created entitling the alien to the benefits of consistent and pre-
dictable practice and procedures by the Immigration Service. The
Immigration Service is apparently willing to concede that these
criteria are legislative rules relating to substantive rights.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the importance of the Nicholas decision, the ear-
lier cases construing the Operations Instructions of the Immigra-
tion Service, and the recently proposed regulations promulgated
by the Service cannot be overemphasized.
The courts have long resisted the argument that an alien should
be entitled to all of the protections guaranteed to one accused of a
criminal offense, 0 5 although they admit that deportation and ban-
ishment can deprive an individual of "all that makes his life worth
living.' 0 6
At least to the extent posiible under administrative law, every
conceivable attempt should be made to safeguard the rights of an
alien who may be subject to expulsion. The Service should right-
99. See id. at 36,189.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 36,191.
102. See generally id. at 36,187-91.
103. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,193 (1979). See also 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1979).
104. With respect to extended voluntary departure and voluntary departure in
general, see the provisions outlined in Operations Instruction 242.10. OPERATIoNs
INsTRUCTIONs, supra note 1, § 242.10.
105. See, e.g., Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 412 U.S. 928
(1973) (deportation statutes are not penal in nature); Marcello v. Kennedy, 194 F.
Supp. 750, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (deportation not punishment and thus not subject
to provisions of eighth amendment).
106. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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fully be constrained by all the safeguards of the Administrative
Procedure Act with respect to its policies, whether they be pub-
lished or promulgated through Operations Instructions, regula-
tions, or other means. With the weight of the entire government
against the alien, he should be entitled to rely upon the fact that
the government will at least be bound by its own directives. Only
by so doing will any petitioner or applicant before the Immigra-
tion Service be assured that the Immigration Service's own pro-
posal will be fulfilled: "to assure that all applicants and
petitioners receive fair and equal treatment before the Serv-
ice. 107
107. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,187 (1979).

